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1. MODERNITY OR BACKWARDNESS
The renewed interest in local political leaders (Garraud 1988 and 1989, for
example) is something more than a trend suitable for reviving the tradition of studying
elites. The research on elected representatives in the sub-state sphere and the
analysis of their policies are the result of verifying that in a Europe without borders,
some new political realities are imposing their logic both from above and, in this case,
from below the states.
However, if the new political significance of local politicians justifies the
greatest theoretical attention, it is also true that the reference to Europe plays a
paradoxical role. In view of European integration and in the new framework of inter-
regional conflict and collaboration relationships, the analysis of 'the local' cannot  be
carried out as a study of a determined level of 'the national' but must be seen from a
broader perspective.
In this sense, our study intends to establish a comparison of Spanish data
with that of other traditionally democratic countries, especially in the Mediterranean
area. To compare the formation of the local Spanish elite with that of other countries
with a greater democratic tradition may serve to clarify the general patterns for local
representation in any circumstances or country, and those which are particular and
specific to the present Spanish context. The first steps in this direction would have to
be complemented subsequently with information relating to other countries, including
those of northern and central Europe.
A comparison of this kind should obviously start with a compulsory question:
Are Spanish local government leaders identical to those of other consolidated
democracies? To those of France?
Although the question may be compulsory, the answer is not of small
importance. Behind it lies a more basic question concerning the modernity of the
Spanish political system. Has Spanish democracy jumped stages, arriving directly at
the political situation of the other European countries; or on the contrary, does it find
itself in some initial phase which will go on evolving later?
You should not be baffled by this question of modernity or backwardness. At
this moment, electoral analyses are suggesting that the fluctuations in the party
system, the lack of party political identification and the electoral volatility which
characterize the party system in Spain may be the result of an accelerated
assumption of post-modernist political culture. If this is true -and we cannot enter into
this debate at present-, Spain would have jumped historical stages to advance,
perhaps in an exaggerated fashion because the compensatory factor of the parties'
historical roots has not existed, the tendencies which other countries will go through.
Placing it at the level of municipal representation, modernity or backwardness
will have to be measured by the similarities and differences in the social categories
present in the town councils. For example, comparing the strength of emerging
movements such as the feminist one which, spanning all the parties, may contribute
to the increase in female representation. Additionally, by the impact of the
educational revolution of recent years, with the huge growth in further and higher
education. And last but not least, the changes in the conception of the function of
local politics, in their professionalism, etc.
On the other hand, to raise the question of identity or similarity between local
political elites may lead us to discover the differences. And supposing that this might
be the essential information, supposing that French and Spanish municipalities are
run by different types of mayors and councillors, it would be therefore be appropriate
to put forward two hypotheses explaining the differences.
The first would make municipal representation depend on a socio-economic
variable. Compared to Europe, could the Spanish peculiarities derive from a lower
level of industrial development or services? Introducing the socio-economic variable
in the analysis seems to reject the supposition of Spanish modernity: under-
development during the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, a late
incorporation into the international post-war economy (the E.E.C. for example), ...
In any case, a second supposition based on political variables is possible. In
this case, the under-development would be attributable to the effects of Francoism on
the political culture (especially in the sphere of participation and management) of the
different social groups.
Abandoning more socio-demographic lines of the kind noted above, that
would lead us to the sphere of the continuity of representation, of the ruptures
between the authoritarian political system and the democratic one, of inter-
generational modifications, and so on.
Following this hypothesis, the differences would be explained by the
continuity between Francoism and democracy, continuity both through the sectors
which are excluded or exclude themselves from municipal representation as through
those who consider it their own particular domain.
Thus, in the first sense, electoral analyses of non-competitive elections
demonstrated that certain social groups, in spite of the pressures of the Francoist
system, were more unwilling to participate in the voting. Some fragmentary
observations note the withdrawal of the better educated sectors, the middle classes
or liberal professionals from the institutional political activity of Francoism (Botella
[1980] phrases it as a withdrawal of 'the intelligentsia'). Could we be up against -and
afterwards we will look at the current situation-  c tinuation of this withdrawal?
And on the other hand, wouldn't forty years of Francoism have been enough
to consolidate a social type of political personnel who would have acquired, without
electoral competition, all the means of power to stay in office after the arrival of the
democratic system?
Modernity, backwardness, political variables, socio-economic variables, ...
these are the issues which, in my judgment, suggest a comparison between Spain
and France. However, stating these problems, does not mean we are already in a
position to answer all these comparative questions. Our aim is more modest and we
will just present some research results on municipal representatives elected
throughout Spain in 1983, based on information from the Ministry of Territorial
Administration1. In some cases, it will be complemented with information relating to
1979, 1983 and 1987 in the Autonomous Region of Catalonia2 (Th s has been
studied in more detail in Capo et al., 1988).
However, before proceeding to this explanation of the socio-demographic
characteristics of the Spanish local political elite, it is important to raise a few
questions, because from the answers obtained, we will conclude whether the
comparative method is adequate or, on the contrary, whether we are analyzing very
diverse realities, even though they may be grouped together under the same name.
2. THE LOCAL POLITICAL ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC SPAIN
Studying councilors and mayors, the elected local leaders, means starting
from a previous assumption: the importance of the local sphere in the understanding
of the political system. Is this really true in Spain's case? Is the local sphere
significant to our political system or, on the contrary, could our scientific interest be
suffering from an effect of imitation? In this case, we would have allowed ourselves to
get carried away by the prestige of the French mayor-parliamentarians or by the
political and administrative weight of Italian municipalities.
Faced with this danger of contagiousness, we can argue that the local
political class in Spain cannot be left out from a scientific study of elites for one
reason, perhaps fundamental and basic but irreplaceable, and even if there were no
other reasons the same argument would still apply: municipal offices are important
because they are elected. And here there would be room for all kinds of ideologies,
from the mystical liberal "à la Tocqueville" who insists on de-centralization, to the
determination of the Left -remember what was happening in France or Italy with the
Communist parties- to present the municipal level as a mirror, as an alternative
model of management.
Municipal elections are therefore one of the phases of the political struggle;
but if desired, other more concrete, less ideological references can be added to
argue the importance of this level.
The starting point is that the local political elite is numerous -69,339 elected
members, 8,142 mayors- By their large numbers, they make up for the lack of
concentration and unity that can take place as opposed to what happens with smaller
nucleii such as members of parliament or those holding high office in the
Administration. This means that, in a population of somewhat more than 38 million
inhabitants, one in every 1,000 citizens holds a position of municipal representation,
thereby making local leaders the true link between civil and political society.
On this point, our situation does not coincide exactly with either French or
Italian figures. In France, local representatives are more numerous, 463,408
(according to the figures of Becquart-Leclercq, 1976) elected in 36,385
municipalities. In Italy, the figure is double to that of Spain, even though the number
of municipalities is approximately the same. In reality then, it seems that the
numerical factor makes the Spanish political establishment weaker in relation to other
countries. (In France there would be eight elected members per one thousand
inhabitants and in Italy, two, in relation to their respective populations).
However, whatever these differences are, the first point to emphasize is the
numerical strength, although on the other hand we must not forget that this is
coupled with an element of weakness, as is the over-representation in the most
under-populated areas of the country. Through the representation of small
communities, the municipal structure does not duplicate but distorts the social
structure (Table 1).
Table1
We are well aware of the fact that the number of councilors is in inverse
proportion to the distribution of the population. We will not at the moment delve into
the inequalities which this provokes in the representation of the political parties,
details of which are shown in the second table.
The explanation for these distortions can be found in the combined effects of
the territorial distribution of the population and the elected members (Table 1), and in
the electoral standard which determines it (Table 3), statistics which we reproduce
without further comment on comparative effects with other countries.
Table2
Table3
These references could lead us to weaken the affirmation that we were
making above about the numerical strength of municipal representatives. Doesn't
their territorial extension, their division, their representation of small localities demand
therefore, that we cease to talk about the municipal political class as a homogeneous
group?
Following this strategy, we would have to concentrate only on
representatives of large municipalities, on the 4% of elected representatives in towns
and cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants who would represent four out of every
ten voters, because only in the large municipalities would political conflict be
generated and only these authorities would have the capacity to undertake large
transforming projects such as, for example, the Olympic Games in Barcelona.
This would undoubtedly be too radical a vision. The relevance of the
argument requires segmentation at the time of the political study, but the fact that the
small towns and villages are important can also be seen in other examples, such as
the difficulties experienced by the Government of the Generalitat of Catalonia with
the Plan for Industrial Waste or the location of a private amusement park.
Furthermore, there is another argument for returning to the larger numbers,
for not forgetting even one councilor, however small the village he may represent. To
compensate for the weakness which territorial distortions may produce, we must
point out that although the level of activism in Spanish political parties is very low, we
suppose that the level of municipal representation becomes more relevant to internal
party matters.
Spanish parties have a very low affiliation rate (Montero, 1981) and in this
context, local elections have been especially outstanding for the parties' territorial
expansion and the attraction of party members.
Referring to Catalonia -although the conclusions would be generally
applicable to the whole of Spain-, we have said that "given the existence of this
strong political-administrative local network, combined with an initial lack of party
activism, municipal leaders had to become one of the most significant core elements
of party political affiliation. And although figures cannot be furnished for all the
Catalonian parties, the following ones related to  PSC serve as an example: 35% of
the delegates in the third and fourth Congress were councilors or mayors; 23% of the
members of the National Council and 15% of the members of the Executive
Commission were also delegates. For this reason, the formation of a local democratic
political elite in Spain should not be regarded as being isolated from the attempts to
consolidate an incipient party system. This is so in such a way that, with no doubt,
the relationships of autonomy-dependency between town halls and parties and their
respective elites -which exist in all countries-, tarted to take shape with certain
particular characteristics in the Spanish system (Capo et al.)”.
In this sense one could interpret the curious inclusion of the imperative
mandate established by the Law of 1978 that regulated the election of members of
City Councils in such a way that it favored party organizations to the detriment of
those elected. Although now revoked by the Constitutional Court, this rule permitted
the consolidation of parties in a domain where they had little influence.
Thus, although it might appear paradoxical in a country of parties without
mass membership, the presence of independent groups in local elections has been
diminishing considerably. In 1983 in Spain, the lists of those representatives with no
party identification accounted for 16.79% of the total. (In Catalonia, more detailed
figures allow us to see a reduction from 42% in 1979 to 27.5% in 1983 and to 17.6%
in 1987, from which we can infer that party predominance appears to be growing
throughout the country).The Spanish figure is very similar to the Italian one in 1987,
also 16.7% (Barberis, 1988), although in this case, independent candidates elected
on party lists are included. And it is a long way from the French figure which in 1965
still showed 200,523 representatives from Local Action lists and from municipal
interests (Becquart-Leclercq).
Thus, there proves to be a notable interdependence between the party
system, party elites and local elites: local political life has found itself shaped by
parties, but these at the same time have a highly pro-municipal composition.
Although the data may not be conclusive -owing as much to the difficulties of
knowing the level of party affiliation3 as to the fact that in the calculation of officials,
the independent candidates elected on party lists also figure-, table 4 expresses the
approximate influence which local representatives could have in the large parties as
a whole.
Table4
Up to this point, we have developed an argument that could be defined as
quantitative, to show the interest in researching on the local political elite despite their
dispersion and over-representation in small towns. We could add to this argument
that the weight of municipalization-ruralization also contributes to the way the political
system as a whole functions.
This is because of the coexistence of two levels of sub-state administration in
Spain, the autonomous communities and the provinces, the latter formed
institutionally by a representative organization of municipal management, the
Diputación or Provincial Council, which has general although not legislative
responsibilities and which therefore can be an opposition power to the autonomous
governments.
It has, in fact, happened. The fall of Garaicoechea as President of the
Basque Government was a reminder of the incidence of the periphery (town councils
and provincial councils) in the central powers, whether they act as an alternative
power or a pressure group.
Finally, we have not mentioned at all another reason which may justify the
study of local elites: their characterization as an obligatory step, advisable and
feasible in the "cursus honorum" which leads to national political distinction.
This is a time-honored subject about which, however, we still have little
information. In any case, it seems that there are noticeable differences, as for
example with France, where the way for local representatives to get promoted has
been restructured.
Although exceptions can be found, for example the former Mayor of Madrid,
Mr. Barranco, who accepted the post of senator after losing the mayoralty by a
censor motion, everything seems to indicate that in fact, if not according to law, a
certain incompatibility exists between national parliamentary representation and local
representation.
The reasons for this must be found in the Law on electoral regulations of
March 18, 1977 which established ineligibility and partial incompatibility for mayors
(at that time, non-elected). The survival of this regulation, as much as for the central
government as for the regional parliaments, until its modification in the Law of
Electoral Regulations of 1985 -together with the extraordinary dedication which the
town councils required in the first years of their democratic operation- explains, in our
opinion, the scarce presence in our system of the mayor-parliamentarian.
This functional separation could evolve in the future and figures allow us to
think that the autonomous parliaments will be the first affected by these
transformations4. However, we must take into account that, in the context of blocked
and closed lists (very different therefore, from the French system), parties will not
only have to consider candidates because they can attract votes, but also because of
a possible loss of the hierarchical control that rests within the parliamentary group, as
these parliamentarian-mayors would have relatively autonomous sources of power.
It is therefore premature to indicate how the significance of local political
careers could evolve in the training program for the national or regional political
class, and everything will depend on the form in which these two aforementioned
tendencies, which initially seem antagonistic, are combined. In any case, however,
making the jobs of mayor and parliamentarian compatible is not the only way of using
a municipal post to obtain access to a greater share of power. It is for this reason that
we should not ignore the importance of the first level of representation in the political
career of future elites, especially in light of the municipalization of the aforementioned
parties.
All these different arguments lead us to believe that the local political elite
constitutes an interesting subject for research in our country, although it may present
some peculiarities in relation to other systems in neighboring countries.
Comparatively, its numerical weakness but greater party political weight, its differing
function in the formation of the national political class, together with its institutional
position, are the aspects which should not be forgotten.
3. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
In this section, we will not carry out a comparison with similar research done
in Italy, apart from other studies of a regional kind, by Baberis (1988) or Bettin and
Magnier (1989), in addition to the French references already mentioned. Despite that,
we are obviously not forgetting our initial comparative aspirations but, as we
understand it, it is not for us to furnish that data at this moment.
Finally, our figures for the whole of Spain are limited to only the 1983 local
elections, for which reason we cannot offer the comparative series we would like to3.
Neither will we enter into a differentiation by parties or regions (Baras; Colomé 1991).
However, given that for the Autonomous Community of Catalonia we have the
complete lists of those elected since the first democratic municipal elections of 1979,
on occasions we will refer to this complementary contribution to indicate possible
guidelines for interpretation of the Spanish system in general4.
Table5
The first point to emphasize is the scarceness of women among local political
officials. 95.5% of municipal representatives are men, which means the proportion of
women does not even reach 5%.
We will not insist in the significance of this fact because it is obvious;
however, it is important to point out that the qualifications of these women, either
academically or professionally, are superior to those of men. Consequently, this
means that the requirements which the parties 'unconsciously' demand of female
representatives for their presence on the lists are greater. Discrimination arises in a
double sense, in women's sparse electoral presence and the high requirements
demanded of them for their participation when it happens.
Moreover, the evolution in Catalonia between 1979 and 1987 is not very
notable; the participation of women rises from 4.6% to 7.4%. It does not seem then,
that the municipal sphere is good ground for the political advancement of women, for
whom it is possible that the momentum of growth comes from the center of the
political system. In this sense, it is foreseeable that the figure resulting in the next
municipal elections of 1991 will be different, because in the most recent PSOE and
PCE congresses, measures of positive discrimination in favor of women have been
adopted. Women will have to fill 25% of the internal and external lists of the party. If
this regulation is fulfilled, female representation will increase in the near future.
More surprising, perhaps, are the figures relating to the composition by age
of the town councils. It is known that the political class which has appeared since the
disappearance of Francoism is young, and the President of the Government, Mr.
Felipe González, may be a good example; however, it is even younger still at a
municipal level, as shown in Table 6.
Table6
There is no need to stress the youth of this group of councilors. In the Spain
of 1983, more than 30% were younger than 34 years old. Almost half were younger
than 39, and if those up to the age of 44 are included in this young group, it
comprises 60.9% of the total. On the other hand, those older than 55 comprise less
than 15%.
The extraordinarily young composition of this group justifies, in our opinion,
two types of reflection. One -on which we do not have more precise data-, is in
relation to the change of elites during the transition from the Francoist system to the
democratic one. The other, to its true significance in the process of formation and
establishment of the democratic elite.
In the first sense, it seems obvious that the continuity of the local Francoist
elite is slight, given the generational rupture which these figures suggest. It is worth
asking, at any rate, if the change in people has meant a change in the social groups
which held the privilege of representation during Franco's time.
In the second sense, the pertinent question is whether these figures
correspond to a foundational stage or lay down a more permanent guideline. It might
seem, in effect, that the change in the political system coincides with or is provoked
by the presence of a new generation which, established in power, would continue
monopolizing it and ageing in their jobs.
It is still early to answer this question if we look at the data provided by
Catalan evolution. The percentages referring to Catalonia show that between 1979
and 1983 there was, in general, no increase in the average age in town councils
because almost all mayors over sixty-five disappeared, and the number of councilors
under 25 years old grew from 3% to 12%. Moreover, this rejuvenation was not the
result of changes in the electoral strength of the parties, but a common phenomenon
repeated in all groups.
On the other hand, the figures of 1987 show a strong change in the
tendency, and although municipal representatives can still be classified as young
(about half are less than forty), their increasing age is evident in relation to 1983 and
also to 1979.
Can anything relevant to Spain as a whole be inferred from this data? Will
this be the keynote for the future? The questions remain open. The first could be the
subject of empirical verification; however, the second brings us to the heart of
municipal leaders’ problems of representativity-professionalization.
The trend of permanent renewal and rejuvenation responds to an electoral
strategy especially directed to capture the young vote; in this sense, the councilor,
the mayor, is a representative. On the other hand, the maintenance and progressive
ageing of municipal personnel seems to influence their management ways, ways that
require a professionalization only obtained by remaining in their positions.
Naturally, to clarify these aspects requires, on the one hand, that
representatives go on establishing themselves in the Spanish political system and
establishing stable guidelines which can allow the interaction between
representativity and professionalization, at present embryonic. But naturally, it also
requires a deepening of the analysis, by introducing other categories on which we
are now starting to work in Catalonia. We not only take age into account, but also
personal continuity in office5.
In any case, the figures relating to Spain, the same as the more extensive
studies on Catalonia, seem to suggest that the factor of representativity has prevailed
over that of professionalization, given the educational level (Table 7) and the socio-
professional composition of representatives (Table 8).
In fact, from an education point of view, municipal representatives in general
are not highly qualified, although they are more so than the population as a whole.
Thus, the officials with university degrees in the entirety of Spanish town councils
does not even reach 10% (and for that reason we mentioned that certain social
groups may have maintained the pattern of withdrawal from political activity during
Franco’s time as well as at present), whereas 21.8% only have elementary education
and 44.3% have only completed their education up to the age of fourteen.
Table7
Obviously, these figures vary according to the size of the town, the level of
education increasing in proportion to the size of municipality. But in any case, taken
in their entirety, they seem to demonstrate that there is the belief that it is not
necessary to have advanced technical training to hold municipal office. However, as
Catalan evolution shows, municipal lists are increasingly acquiring a more highly-
educated profile.
To a certain extent, the socio-professional categories correlate with the
preceding results. The number of liberal professionals, technicians, civil servants and
teachers (groups which in other countries have often dedicated themselves to
political action) is not high, neither is that of self-employed workers, shopkeepers,
executives or businessmen. All these groups together slightly exceed a quarter of the
total number of councilors.
Table8
On the other hand, there are numerous councilors who come from social
categories in decline, such as agricultural workers (36.6%), or from the employed
(11.3%) or unskilled sectors (18.1%). Thus it would seem that the least-favored social
groups find in municipal office a certain kind of advancement and representation,
although the latter may, in some sense, be understood as vicarial.
Apparently, political municipal society and civil society do not coincide, and
as a further proof we will make one last point regarding the origin of representatives.
According to our information, 73.6% were born in the municipality they represent,
16.5% in the same province and only 9% in other provinces6. However, the Spanish
internal migratory flow has been very high during this century, and particularly during
the last few decades. Thus, "census information on the number of emigrants per
judicial district shows that 10,868,725 Spanish nationals abandoned their town of
origin between 1900 and 1970, although the present figure may probably exceed 14
million. To be more specific, in the period between the census of 1960 and that of
1970, no less than 4,473,000 abandoned their municipality of origin; 4,180,371
changed their municipality of residence between 1971 and 1982, and 1,445,196 did
so between 1982 and 1986" (Tezanos).
Municipal representation appears then to be dominated by local factors,
disconnected from the socially dominant economic sectors which are representative
of numerous traditional social categories. In this sense, one might ask whether, next
to the figure of the representative/promoter which may exist in large cities, one can
imagine municipal representation in its entirety - ha  is to say, with the predominance
of the small and medium size localities- as a refuge for certain sectors in face of the
current socio-economic changes.
However, it may seem that with this affirmation we are contradicting the
previous hypothesis of a vicarial representation. Accept the two suggestions then, as
the extreme poles which may guide our research in the future, but do not think that
they are contradictory. Groups aiming social transformation may cede to others the
cost (in terms of time, dedication and conflict) of municipal management, in exchange
for benefits (symbolic and of control) which these groups would obtain.
Thus, local representation could be an instance of compensation: much
unemployment among young people but many young people among the councilors; a
reduction in the availability of agricultural work but a strong presence of farm laborers
in town councils; a radical renewal of village population, but conservation of
representation by those native to the area; a growth in self-employment but
representation on the part of workers.
This hypothesis of the compensatory function of municipal representation
may perhaps be too bold; but we dare to express it in the hope that comparing it at
an international level will be useful to better understand our own society.
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8
NOTES
(1)The figures for Spain as a whole in 1983 come from the Ministry of Territorial Administration. Their
codification and analysis has been achieved thanks to the support from the Center for Sociological
Research, and would not have been possible without the personal interest of its President, Rosa
Conde and her Vice-President José Ramón Montero. The research group is formed by Montserrat
Baras, Joan Botella, Gabriel Colomé and Lourdes López Nieto, as well as the author of this article.
(2)The specifically Catalan research has been done in collaboration with the Jaume Bofill Foundation
for information relating to 1979, and the Institute of Political and Social Sciences of Barcelona, and
especially its director Isidre Molas, for information relating to 1983 and 1987.
(3)We have used data from 1984, even though the relative figures for councilors are from 1983.
However, this survey, originating from the media (El País, October 14, 1984), does not have the
methodological accuracy of the academic works (in any case written before the radical
transformation of the party system in the general election of 1982 and, as such, unusable). Thus,
the figures can only be considered as an indication.
(4)After the local elections of 1987, the third legislature of the Catalan Parliament shows that 15.5% of
delegates have municipal representation responsibilities.
(5)According to Catalan data of 1987 and the measure in which it is possible to extrapolate them for
other regions in Spain or for other elections, it seems that the renewal rate is high, because only
39.4% of those elected in 1983 continued their term of office.
(6)The analysis of immigration in Catalonia and its political repercussions deserve specific treatment
which we cannot give here. See Botella, J. and Marcet, J. "La inmigración en Cataluña: electores,
partidos y representación política". Sistema. 1981. num. 45.
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